This paper examines the relation between price differences and quality differences in an oligopoly model with intra-industry trade, where goods are horizontally as well as vertically differentiated. The analysis demonstrates that the ratio of prices is not linked to the ratio of qualities in any simple way. The paper therefore questions empirical trade studies using unit values as an indicator for the quality of the traded goods. However, we also show that the ratio of prices is a reasonable proxy for the ratio of qualities if sunk cost is dominating in the cost structure.
Introduction
International trade between developed countries mostly consists of differentiated products. Even for quite narrow defined product groups, intra-industry trade makes up a large part of the trade. The 'new' trade theory explains these basic features of evidence on international trade in various models based on monopolistic competition or oligopoly.
Correspondence Address: Jørgen Drud Hansen, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, 5230 Odense M, Denmark. Email: joe@sam.sdu.dk 420 J. D. Hansen & J. Ulff-Møller Nielsen The extensive literature on the 'new' trade theory makes a distinction between intra-industry trade in horizontally or vertically differentiated goods. In accordance with Lancaster (1966 Lancaster ( , 1979 , two products are horizontally differentiated when the two products have the same set of characteristics, but in different proportions. In such cases, all variants will be demanded, at least for limited price differences. Two products are vertically differentiated, i.e. differentiated with respect to quality if the absolute amount of all characteristics between the two products differs. The variant with more characteristics in some or all dimensions has a higher quality for all consumers, and hence the rank of prices reveals the rank of qualities.
Until quite recently, the theoretical analyses of international trade with differentiated products assumed either horizontally or vertically differentiated products. Krugman (1979 Krugman ( , 1980 initiated the large number of analyses based on monopolistic competition, love-of-variety preferences and product differentiation without quality differences. Moreover, all firms were assumed to have the same productivity and the different variants to have the same price. Recently, these models have been generalized by Melitz (2003) and others into what has been termed the 'new-new' trade theory with different firm productivities as the basic extension. In these models, firms charge different prices even though products are not differentiated vertically at all.
Another strain of the literature on two-way trade disregards horizontal product differentiation and concentrates on vertical product differentiation assuming oligopoly. A prominent contribution in this tradition has been provided by Shaked and Sutton (1984) , who explain trade in quality-differentiated products as the outcome of the firm's strategic game with research and development expenditures as the instrument to develop quality.
Parallel with these theoretical analyses, empirical studies have also classified intra-industry trade (IIT) in either horizontally or vertically differentiated products. For sorting out whether the specific trade flow is horizontal or vertical IIT, Abd-el-Rahman (1991) has suggested using the unit value of exports to imports in the absence of information on product qualities of countries. More specifically, he classifies IIT as horizontal if the unit value of export to unit value of import differs by less than a specific threshold value of typically 15%, while it is classified as vertical IIT if this ratio of unit values exceeds 15%. This procedure for classification of IIT has been followed in a large number of empirical studies, see for example Greenaway et al. (1994 Greenaway et al. ( , 1995 Greenaway et al. ( , 1999 ; Aturupane et al. (1999) ; Hu and Ma (1999) ; Blanes and Martin (2000) ; and Gullstrand (2002) .
This two-category perception is obviously a huge simplification. Shaked and Sutton (1987) notice that two-way trade flows very often consist of products that are differentiated both horizontally and vertically. Footwear makes this point clear as this product fulfils different functions depending on weather conditions, and so on (e.g. sandals, boots, urban footwear and city shoes). In addition, qualities may significantly differ depending on the materials (e.g. leather or composition leather) and design. Also, within a given quality segment for a given function (e.g. city shoes of leather for men) many different brands may be available, with some consumers preferring one to another, and other consumers the opposite (for identical prices).
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The theories on IIT have recently been generalized with models that include both horizontal and vertical product differentiation. Helble and Okubo (2008) and Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) have expanded the Melitz (2003) monopolistic competition model by specifying quality-augmented love-of-variety preferences. Hallak and Sividassan (2009) have combined two sources of firm heterogeneity in their models: productivity in the traditional sense, as well as the ability of the firm to develop high quality, where this ability is reflected by the low fixed costs of developing quality. Similarly, Hansen and Nielsen (2006) have analyzed IIT in an oligopoly model where the products are differentiated both horizontally and vertically.
In empirical investigations, recent studies by Hallak (2006) and Hallak and Schott (2008) question that export prices (unit values) only reflect quality differences and claim that export price differences might reflect differences in qualities as well as production costs. The study by Hallak and Schott (2008) develops a methodology to decompose countries' observed export prices into quality and quality-adjusted-price components, the latter measuring variations in product prices induced by factors other than quality, e.g. comparative advantages and currency misalignment. 1 Empirically, they show for several countries that export prices and qualities evolve quite differently.
The aim of this paper is to provide a formal analysis of using price as an indicator for quality in international trade. The recent models of IIT, based on both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, provide a framework for such an analysis. The crucial question, which will be investigated in this paper, is whether prices of exports to imports for a specific product reveal the quality structure of exports to imports for this product. In the following, we analyze this question in a duopoly model. As appears from the industrial organization and business strategy literature, oligopoly is a highly relevant market structure that captures the strategic interaction between companies. 2 The basic features of the model are the following. The two producers are located with one producer in each of two countries. The horizontal position in a Lancaster type of horizontal product differentiation is exogenously given while quality is a strategic variable for the two producers. The choice of quality determines the cost structure, i.e. marginal production costs and sunk costs in developing quality. We solve the model for the Nash equilibrium and show that the ratio of prices in international trade is not associated with the ratio of qualities in a simple way, as also stressed by Hallak and Schott (2008) and Hallak and Sividassan (2009) . Therefore, reservations have to be kept in mind when prices (unit values) are reported as indicators of quality. However, the endogeneity of quality and costs may in some cases justify the use of prices as an indicator for quality if sunk costs are dominating in the cost structure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops and solves the model. Section 3 applies the solutions of the model to an analysis of the (possible) link between the ratio of qualities and the ratio of prices. Section 4 concludes.
The Basic Model
The model presented below describes, in a two-country/two-producer context, market equilibrium and trade pattern in a market where the products are differentiated both horizontally and vertically. The basic specification of these two dimensions of tastes of the consumers has been suggested by Garella (2003 Garella ( , 2006 for a closed economy. This specification has later been used by Hansen and Nielsen (2006) in an analysis of foreign trade. The following model is an extended version of Hansen and Nielsen (2006) as we allow quality to influence not only fixed costs but also variable costs. Moreover, in the following analysis we specifically focus the question of prices as the informant of qualities.
The world consists of two countries, A and B, with one producer in each. Each producer i (i = 1, 2) produces only one product, which is differentiated from the product of the other producer both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, the quality of the product is characterized by a quality indicator θ (θ ≥ 0). In the horizontal dimension, each consumer has an address or ideal variant characterized by x, where x = [0, 1]. Each consumer is assumed to consume one unit only of the differentiated good. The consumer chooses the variant, which offers the largest utility gain, given by the gross utility of consuming the good minus the costs of acquiring it. These costs consist of the price at the gate of the producer plus trade costs, in case the consumer prefers the foreign good. The consumers in each country are uniformly distributed with respect to x in the interval 0 to 1. However, the two countries might be asymmetrical in size. The number of consumers is normalized to 1 in country A and to σ in country B, and throughout the following analysis it is assumed that σ ≥ 1.
The producer's position in the horizontal characteristic space is exogenously given, while that in the vertical characteristic space is a strategic choice. Firm 1 is located in country A at the endpoint 0 and firm 2 in country B at the endpoint 1 of the horizontal characteristic space. 3 Hence, for a consumer at the address x, the horizontal distance to the producer in country A is x and (1 − x) in country B, respectively. However, if the consumer demands the foreign good, he incurs trade costs at g per unit. Each of the producers aims to maximize his profit. Although the markets are partially segmented by trade costs, we assume that it is impossible for the producer to distinguish between domestic and foreign buyers. Each producer therefore charges a uniform price, i.e. price discrimination is neglected.
For the consumer in country A, the utility (consumer surplus) of consuming one unit of the good produced by the domestic or the foreign producer is given by an additive separable specification of the vertical and horizontal dimensions: 4
and
For a consumer in country B, the utility of consuming one unit of the foreign good or alternatively the domestic good is given by:
where v is an exogenously given parameter, t a parameter for utility loss per unit increase in the horizontal distance between a consumer and a producer, p prices obtained by producers and g trade costs. 5 The first subscript indicates the market (country) and the second the supplier (producer). For convenience, the unit in measuring quality is chosen so that an increase of quality by one unit raises utility by the same amount as a decrease of price by one unit. The horizontal part of consumer preferences allows the producers to charge different prices for their products for given qualities without capturing or losing the whole market and this makes the analysis of the relationship between prices and qualities relevant.
Turning to the costs, quality may influence costs through two channels. First, marginal production costs may depend on quality. For example, cars are typically produced with and without extra equipment, and installing extra equipment in the car raises unit variable production costs. Similarly, for DRAM chips the density (as a measure for quality) may be smaller or larger, influencing unit variable costs. Secondly, the higher quality of a good (e.g. cars or DRAM chips) often appears as a result of R&D activity and, in such cases, the firm also incurs sunk costs when it develops quality. To take both arguments into account, we specify the following cost function for the two firms:
where (c + λθ i ) is marginal production costs and 1/2θ 2 i is the flow equivalent fixed costs of the sunk costs for developing quality. The marginal production 4 The additive specification of quality in the utility function has been suggested by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and has later been used in several analyses, for example, Tirole (1988) . Another specification of quality in the utility function is to use a multiplicative specification, where basic utility depends on consumption of other (non-differentiated) goods, which varies proportionately with the quality indicator of the differentiated good. This alternative specification has been introduced by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and later used by Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Boom (1995) , among others. 5 The specification of the utility function disregards diversity of tastes with respect to quality. Usually the specification of the utility function includes both a good-specific indicator of quality and a consumer-specific parameter related to the weight the consumer puts on quality, see for example Tirole (1988). costs increase with quality specified by the parameter λ, i.e. c represents marginal production costs for the lowest quality (i.e. quality level zero). The parameter λ is less than 1 as λ ≥ 1 leaves no incentive to provide goods with quality above zero as the extra utility from quality falls below the extra unit production costs from quality. The fixed costs increase more than proportionately with respect to quality due to diminishing returns of R&D activity. The cost functions are assumed to be symmetric for the two firms as the focus in the following analysis is on the strategic interaction between the firms.
The producers maximize perceived profit using the quality level and price of their variants as strategic variables. It is assumed that each producer in a first-stage game chooses his quality level and subsequently chooses prices in the second-stage game. The Nash equilibrium is derived by backward induction, i.e. by deriving the prices for given qualities, and then determination of qualities. 6 In a given market, a competitive edge exists between the two producers, defined as the location of a marginal consumer, who is indifferent whether to buy the variant from one or the other producer. In country A, the competitive edgex A is determined by:
Similarly, the competitive edge in country B is given bỹ
Total demand for product 1 and 2, Q 1 and Q 2 , respectively, is given by:
Profits, π i , for the two producers are given by:
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Bertrand Equilibrium -The Second-Stage Game
Prices and levels of output for the two producers are determined by a Bertrand optimization for a given set of qualities for the products. Inserting equations (4a) and (4b) into equation (5) and maximizing each producer's profit with respect to his own price gives the price reaction functions for the producers in country 1 and 2, respectively. Solving these price reaction functions with respect to prices gives the Bertrand equilibrium:
Using equations (6a) and (6b) in equations (4a) and (4b) gives the quantity demanded or output in equilibrium:
Quality Equilibrium -The First-Stage Game
Inserting the Bertrand solution into equation (5) translates the two profit functions to functions of qualities only. This allows us to deal with the first game: determination of quality levels. Each of the two producers optimizes the quality of his product given the quality of the competitor's product. This gives the following quality reaction functions for producer 1 and 2, respectively: 7
Solving equations (8a) and (8b) gives the final solution for qualities, equations (9a) and (9b), and inserting these results in the Bertrand solution, equations (6a) and (6b), gives the final solution for prices, equations (10a) and (10b).
Let us take a closer look at the results, equations (9a)-(10b). First of all, we observe that the quality levels and hence prices are equal in the special cases where either trade costs are zero or market sizes are equal. In the more general cases, with trade costs and differences in market sizes, the producer in the large economy will choose a higher quality and charge a higher price compared with the producer in the small economy. Moreover, for the producer in the large economy, quality and price increase with respect to trade costs and market size, respectively, while the opposite is the case for the producer in the small economy. The intuition behind these formal results follows from the assumption that quality demands fixed costs. It is easier to recover fixed costs for a firm when it is located in the big market, and quality and price will therefore be higher for the producer in the big market compared with the producer in the small market. For the same reason, the advantage of developing quality for the producer in the big market increases with trade costs, and hence the quality and price lead for this producer increases with trade costs. The horizontal preference parameter t does not influence the average level of quality expressed by the first term on the right-hand side of equations (9a) and (9b), but the incentive of the producers to differentiate their product quality, expressed by the second term of equations (9a) and (9b), decreases as the perceived extra sale from increasing quality decreases when t increases.
Looking at λ, we see that larger values of λ have complex impacts on qualities for both producers. When larger quality is associated with larger marginal production costs, the incentive to develop quality weakens for both producers, i.e. the first term in equations (9a) and (9b) decreases. Moreover, in the strategic game between the two producers, the high quality producer will be weakened most in quality competition since his high quality transmits to high variable production costs and prices. This effect is reflected in the second term of equations (9a) and (9b), which decreases for the high quality producer compared with the low quality producer, for whom the term increases. For increasing values of λ the quality gap therefore narrows and so does the price gap.
Notice, finally, that contrary to the price levels, the Nash equilibrium for the quality levels does not depend on c, the quality independent parameter of marginal production costs. This is due to the simplification of symmetry, where both firms Price as an Indicator for Quality in International Trade? 427 incur c. In equilibrium, this cost term translates into the prices without influencing the outcome of the strategic game with respect to qualities.
The Price-Quality Relationship
We now turn to the main issue in this paper, namely the relation between price ratios and quality ratios. Using equations (9a)-(10b) gives:
When Prices are Good Indicators for Qualities
In the special case where the quality independent part of marginal production costs is zero (c = 0), it follows from equation (11) that the price ratio perfectly measures the quality ratio. In this case all production costs -variable and fixedare quality dependent and changes in production costs, due to changes in qualities, translate fully to prices, ensuring that the ratio of prices equals the ratio of qualities. It follows from equation (11) that for relatively small values of c, unit values provide a good approximation of the quality ratio.
When Prices are More Uncertain Indicators for Qualities
From equation (11), it also follows that for large values of c the price ratio will be close to one irrespective of the quality ratio. Using a criterion where trade is classified as trade with horizontally differentiated products if prices differ less than a specific threshold value of, for example, 15%, may therefore be misleading. To be more specific, international trade within industries with (large) marginal costs, which are only to a small extent quality-dependent, may therefore erroneously be classified as trade in horizontally differentiated products in cases where quality differences are substantial. It should be stressed that the decoupling of the price ratio from the quality ratio is related to the quality independent marginal production costs. High quality dependent marginal production costs, i.e. high values of λ translate into lower average qualities for the two producers, see equations (9a) and (9b), and the pass through on marginal production costs (c + λθ) is therefore dampened. In the special case of λ = 1, qualities for both producers are zero and hence equal, but price differences still persist due to differences in market size, trade costs and the intensity of horizontal preferences. 8 8 To illustrate the importance of λ, assume σ = 2; t = 1; g = 1, and c = 1. For λ equal to 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95 and 0.99 respectively, the measurement error in using price ratios as an indicator of quality ratios (i.e. (θ * 2 /θ * 1 )/(p * 2 /p * 1 )) is 18.1%, 12.8%, 11.4%, 11.3% and 11.3% respectively.
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The Signal Value of Price Changes for Changes in Quality
In cases where the price ratio gives misleading information about the quality ratio, a comparative static analysis shows that changes of the ratio in prices in some cases may provide correct information about changes in the quality ratio.
To demonstrate this, we look at the cases where trade costs, market size and the strength of horizontal preferences vary for given cost structures. For trade costs g, we have, as explained in Section 2, that a decrease in trade costs decreases both relative quality and relative price. The change in relative price thus correctly indicates the direction of change in relative quality.
Similarly, price ratio and quality ratio are positively correlated when the market size parameter σ changes. If the market size in the larger market increases, the incentives to develop quality increases for the producer in this market as the R&D-costs are distributed on a larger sale. Therefore, also in this case, the price ratio correctly indicates the change in the quality ratio.
The positive correlation between quality and price ratios also holds for changes in the value of the parameter for the horizontal preference t. For increasing values of t, consumers are more loyal to their preferred variant and this benefits especially the producer located in the small country as his position in the larger market is improved. The producer in the smaller market therefore raises the quality of his product while the producer in the large market reduces the quality of his product. The weakened competition between the two producers due to the consumers' increased loyalty tends to raise both producers' prices, but due to the quality changes the producer in the smaller market will raise his price most. They will therefore act more similar with respect to both quality and price.
The above results show that -for given cost structure -changes in price ratio correctly predict changes in quality specialization over time: if the ratio of unit values of exports to imports widens (narrows), the quality content of the exported product increases (decreases) relative to the quality content of the imported product in this industry irrespective of the size of the initial quality gap.
A Generalization -Asymmetries
In the analysis above, the only basic asymmetry is the difference in market size. However, the producers may also differ in cost efficiency, which is specified by generalizing the cost function (2) to: C i = (c i + λ i θ i )Q i + 1/2ϕ i θ 2 i ; i = 1, 2 where c i , λ i and ϕ i are firm specific cost parameters with ϕ i reflecting the cost effectiveness of the firm in developing quality.
The cost parameters influence the solutions for price and quality and it is no longer certain that the producer located in the large country specializes in producing the high quality product. Compared with the large country, the smaller country may be abundant in human capital, which is of crucial importance in R&D-activities in developing quality, i.e. ϕ 1 < ϕ 2 . If this efficiency advantage of the producer in the small country is sufficiently large, the rank of quality reverses so the high quality product is produced by the producer in the small Price as an Indicator for Quality in International Trade? 429 country. A more general specification with asymmetries thus widens the range of solutions for prices and qualities and the reservation for the use of prices as proxy for qualities thus becomes even more relevant.
Conclusions
Empirical studies of intra-industry trade very often use unit values of exports to imports to distinguish between horizontally and vertically differentiated trade flows. This paper analyses in an oligopoly model the content of information of prices on qualities. Prices depend both on costs and demand parameters, including preferences for the horizontal characteristics of products. The link between price and quality is intricate and the use of unit values as an indicator for qualities is therefore, in general, questionable.
Quality is perceived as a strategic variable for each firm in its optimization and its choice of quality influences its costs. Taking this endogeneity of quality into account gives some rough guidelines when unit values may provide reasonable information on qualities. If quality especially demands R&D-costs, while the quality independent marginal production costs are low, the unit value ratio approximates the quality ratio. If these assumptions about cost structure are not fulfilled, the unit value is a more dubious indicator for the quality ratio.
